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The role of prediction error (PE) in driving learning is well-established in fields such as clas-
sical and instrumental conditioning, reward learning and procedural memory; however, its
role in human one-shot declarative encoding is less clear. According to one recent hypoth-
esis, PE reflects the divergence between two probability distributions: one reflecting the
prior probability (from previous experiences) and the other reflecting the sensory evidence
(from the current experience). Assuming unimodal probability distributions, PE can be
manipulated in three ways: (1) the distance between the mode of the prior and evidence,
(2) the precision of the prior, and (3) the precision of the evidence. We tested these three
manipulations across five experiments, in terms of peoples’ ability to encode a single pre-
sentation of a scene-item pairing as a function of previous exposures to that scene and/or
item. Memory was probed by presenting the scene together with three choices for the pre-
viously paired item, in which the two foil items were from other pairings within the same
condition as the target item. In Experiment 1, we manipulated the evidence to be either
consistent or inconsistent with prior expectations, predicting PE to be larger, and hence
memory better, when the new pairing was inconsistent. In Experiments 2a–c, we manip-
ulated the precision of the priors, predicting better memory for a new pairing when the
(inconsistent) priors were more precise. In Experiment 3, we manipulated both visual noise
and prior exposure for unfamiliar faces, before pairing them with scenes, predicting better
memory when the sensory evidence was more precise. In all experiments, the PE hypothe-
ses were supported. We discuss alternative explanations of individual experiments, and
conclude the Predictive Interactive Multiple Memory Signals (PIMMS) framework provides
the most parsimonious account of the full pattern of results.
 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).Introduction
Animals constantly extract regularities from past expe-
riences to enable predictions about future events. Given
that their environment is continuously changing, these
predictions likewise need to adapt to novel information
that may conflict with previously acquired expectations.
The degree of conflict between predictions and new infor-mation is called prediction error (PE). PE plays a key role in
many domains, such as reward learning, motivational con-
trol and decision making (Mackintosh, 1975; Pearce & Hall,
1980; Rescorla & Wagner, 1972; Schultz, Dayan, &
Montague, 1997; Schultz & Dickinson, 2000; Sutton &
Barto, 1998). Formal associative learning theories, for
instance, state that learning is proportional to PE, where
PE is the difference between expected and actual reward
(Beesley & Shanks, 2012; Rescorla & Wagner, 1972). The
recently proposed ‘Predictive Interactive Multiple Memory
Signals’ (PIMMS) framework (Henson & Gagnepain, 2010)
suggests that PE plays a general role throughout the
human brain, in the service of both perception and multi-
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priming and even declarative (e.g., episodic) memory.
Predictions are central to most computational models of
learning. PE is the basis of the ‘‘delta” learning rule used in
many connectionist models of human memory (Kinder &
Shanks, 2001), though some have argued that such models
cannot capture the one-shot learning that is characteristic
of human declarative memory (Reber, 2002; although see
Kinder & Shanks, 2003). More recent computational work
suggests that the precision of predictions is an important
determinant of the learning rate (e.g., Yu & Dayan, 2005),
with the certainty of predictions possibly triggering a
switch between gradual and rapid (e.g., one-shot) learning
systems (Lee, O’Doherty, & Shimojo, 2015). Although PE is
often taken for granted as a driver of learning, direct beha-
vioural evidence for its role in one-shot learning of unique
stimulus-stimulus associations, however, is scarce.
The most relevant work is by Le Pelley and colleagues
(Griffiths & Mitchell, 2008; Le Pelley, 2010; Le Pelley,
Beesley, & Suret, 2007; Le Pelley & McLaren, 2003), in par-
ticular their studies examining the impact of trained pre-
dictive and non-predictive cues on learning (Le Pelley,
2010). Across several experiments, these authors demon-
strated more rapid discrimination learning when cues
were previously established to be predictive. However,
the content of the predictions was unrelated to the content
of the information subsequently learned, leaving open the
question of the role PE plays in learning. Moreover, most of
these studies were based on animal learning paradigms,
which differ in several ways from the paired-associate tra-
dition often used to measure human declarative memory.
Firstly, the animal learning paradigms normally involve
multiple learning trials, rather than the single-trial learn-
ing. Secondly, these paradigms generally pair each stimu-
lus with one of two outcomes (e.g., A+, B+, C, D,
where + and  signify presence or absence of reward),
rather than pairing two unique stimuli, as here (e.g., AB,
CD, etc.). Perhaps most importantly, the animal para-
digms tend to involve multiple stimuli (cues) associated
with an outcome (e.g., AB+, AC). With multiple cues, fac-
tors like selective attention become more important, in
that participants can devote relatively more attention to
those cues that are more predictive (Le Pelley, 2010; see
also Kruschke, Kappenman, & Hetrick, 2005).
Other related work has investigated the effect of tempo-
ral context predictions on human memory, using repeated
sequences or sub-sequences. These findings include better
encoding into short-term memory for items that are less
well predicted (Farrell & Lewandowsky, 2002) and better
memory for items whose temporal context is repeated,
even if the items themselves are not (Smith, Hasinski, &
Sederberg, 2013), provided the prediction is strong (else
the memory can actually be weakened, Kim, Lewis-
Peacock, Norman, & Turk-Browne, 2014). However, none
of this work has systematically tested long-term memory
for multiple, unique stimulus-stimulus associations, nor
manipulated PE by independently varying the precision
and the accuracy of predictions.
PIMMS is a general framework for understanding how
prior knowledge influences the perception and acquisition
of new information. The brain is assumed to contain hier-archical representations of the world, where representa-
tions active at one level of the hierarchy predict the
activity of representations in lower levels. The difference
between those predictions and the sensory evidence from
lower levels comprises the PE, and this PE is assumed to
drive synaptic change (learning) between levels, so as to
improve predictions and ultimately minimise PE in future
(Friston, 2005; Mumford, 1992). PIMMS does not specify
the precise mechanism by which PE drives learning, e.g.,
whether that be ‘‘local” PE in a delta-learning rule that
updates individual weights, ‘‘global” PE that modulates
overall learning rate across all weights, or even whether
PE only triggers increased attention, and it is attention that
actually mediates memory encoding. What PIMMS offers is
a Bayesian framework for considering how PE might vary
in the world, and therefore be manipulated experimentally
in the laboratory. As an example, PIMMS assumes that
walking into a familiar room activates a representation of
that room, which in turn predicts what objects are
expected inside the room. Objects that are present and pre-
dicted do not produce a PE, and no learning results; an
unexpected (but familiar) object, however, produces a PE,
which causes learning to update the predictions so that
the object becomes more expected in that room in future.
Walking into a completely novel room, on the other hand,
does not generate predictions, so a novel object in a novel
room will not be encoded because there is no PE (despite
the maximal novelty of the situation). A familiar object in
a novel room, on the other hand, does produce a PE and
its association with that room will be learned faster than
a novel object.
In the present study, we set out to provide evidence for
this core assumption of PIMMS that PE drives one-shot
learning within a more typical human associative memory
(paired associate) laboratory paradigm. We conducted five
behavioural experiments that measured memory for a sin-
gle pairing of two visual stimuli, as a function of the prior
history of those stimuli. According to PIMMS, PE can be
defined as the divergence between an expected outcome
(prior) and an observed outcome (evidence); also called
the ‘‘Bayesian Surprise” (Friston, 2010). Assuming uni-
modal probability distributions, Fig. 1 illustrates three
ways in which this PE can be manipulated. Firstly, one
can vary the accuracy of the prediction, i.e., the difference
between the modes of the prior and evidence distributions,
with a larger difference producing greater PE (Fig. 1a). This
is akin to a room predicting a familiar object that is differ-
ent from the one encountered there. This is the approach
we took in Experiment 1, by establishing predictions (pri-
ors) for the valence of a word given a category of scenes
in a Training Phase, and then testing associative memory
for new scene-word pairings presented in a second ‘‘Study”
phase, where the new word (evidence) was either consis-
tent (low PE) or inconsistent (high PE) with the valence
predicted by the trained scene category. Importantly, we
tested memory with three-alternative forced choice
(3AFC), in which all the response options came from the
same Study phase, in order to prevent proactive interfer-
ence from the Training phase.
A second way to manipulate PE is to vary the precision
of the prediction (i.e., sharpness of the prior distribution;
Fig. 1. Changes in Prediction Error as a result of modulating the difference between the mean of the prior and evidence (Experiment 1), modulating the
precision of prior expectations (Experiment 2a–c) or modulating the precision of the sensory evidence (Experiment 3). The curves represent probability
distributions over a hypothetical dimension along which stimuli vary in similarity (x-axis). The blue, solid line represents the prior probability of one
stimulus (e.g., word or face) given a cue (e.g., scene), while the red, dotted line represents the sensory evidence (likelihood) for that stimulus. Prediction
Error is the divergence (lack of overlap) between these two distributions (i.e., greater when shaded area of overlap in prior and evidence is smaller). (For
interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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that contains a familiar (but unexpected) object and is the
approach we took in Experiments 2a–c. More specifically,
we paired a scene with (i) a single face multiple times,
(ii) a single face only once, or (iii) multiple different faces.
The ability to associate these scenes with completely new
faces was subsequently tested using 3AFC. Better memory
performance was expected when the scene had previously
established a more precise prediction for a specific face.
The final way in which we manipulated PE in Experi-
ment 3 was by varying the precision of the evidence
(Fig. 1c). We did this in two ways: (1) by adding visual
noise to unfamiliar faces (assumed to decrease the preci-
sion of the evidence) and (2) priming a subset of them in
advance (assumed to increase the precision of the evi-
dence). When pairing these with an arbitrary scene (with
no prior predictions), we expected better scene-face mem-
ory (i.e., 3AFC performance) for the primed and noise-free
faces. This example is akin to varying the familiarity of an
object appearing in a novel room.
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 varied the accuracy of the priors, in terms
of their difference from the evidence. First, participants
were trained to associate particular categories of everyday
scenes with categories of words describing a positive ornegative emotional valence. In a later Study phase, novel
scenes from the same categories were paired with novel
words whose valence was either the same (consistent, or
‘‘Low PE” condition) or opposite (inconsistent, or ‘‘High
PE” condition) to that originally associated with the scene
category in the Training phase. Trials of both conditions
were intermixed, and interspersed with other consistent
trials, ensuring that predictions were generally main-
tained. To confirm that expectations were established, par-
ticipants provided explicit predictions regarding the
valence of the word expected to be paired with a scene.
In the Test phase, a 3AFC test was used to assess how well
the new scene-word pairings were encoded during the
critical Study Phase, by providing a scene and a choice of
three words. Importantly, the 3AFC foil words were (1)
from the same condition as the target item, i.e., either all
from the Low PE condition or all from the High PE condi-
tion, (2) presented in other trials of the Study phase, and
(3) of the same valence. These constraints meant that
above-chance 3AFC performance required memory for
the specific Study phase pairing, i.e., could not be solved
by general knowledge of the word category (valence) asso-
ciated with the scene in training, nor by familiarity with
the individual words. We predicted that 3AFC performance
would be better for inconsistent than consistent pairings,
i.e., better in High PE than Low PE conditions.
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Participants
Twenty Cambridge community members were
recruited from the volunteer panel of the MRC Cognition
and Brain Science Unit (12 females, mean age 26), all of
whom had reported normal or corrected-to-normal visual
acuity, provided informed consent and received monetaryFig. 2. Design of Experiment 1. An initial Familiarisation phase informed particip
valence through passive ‘Watch’ and active ‘Predict’ blocks. In the subsequent
specific words (adjectives) that possessed the same valence as that given in the
paired with new words of the same valence as Training, but on the third time a
switched from that experienced during Training/Familiarisation (inconsistent: H
condition) on the other half. Because these ‘‘critical” Study trials were intermixed
the Study phase (for which the valence of the paired word was always consistent
was only 1/6th of trials in the Study phase. Memory for the pairings in the critica
3AFC in which the target word was offered together with two foil words that wer
during the critical Study Phase.compensation for participation, as approved by a local
ethics committee (Cambridge Psychological Research
Ethics Committee reference 2005.08).Procedure
The procedure consisted of four phases, as illustrated in
Fig. 2, with each phase detailed below.ants about which scene category was associated with positive or negative
Training phase, new scenes from the same categories were paired with
Familiarisation phase. In the critical Study phase, new scenes were again
scene category was presented, the valence of the paired word was either
igh PE condition) on one half of trials, or remained (consistent: Low PE
with ‘‘filler” trials of first and second presentations of a scene category in
with Training/Familiarisation), the overall proportion of inconsistent trials
l trials of the Study phase was assessed in the final Test Phase, which used
e of the same valence and encountered in other trials of the same condition
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The Familiarisation phase served to establish partici-
pants’ scene-valence expectations. 48 pictures each from
unique categories were presented in 4 cycles of 12 new tri-
als, with each cycle containing a ‘watch’ block and at least
one ‘predict’ block. The ‘watch’ block, presented a scene
with either the word ‘positive’ or the word ‘negative’ for
2000 ms with the instruction to memorise the pairings.
The ‘predict’ blocks presented the same 12 scenes in ran-
dom order, and participants pressed a key to indicate
whether each was associated with ‘positive’ or ‘negative’.
Following the response, a blank screen appeared for
100 ms and the correct valence was superimposed on the
scene for 1000 ms. A final predict block was run in which
all 48 scenes were presented.
Training phase
The Training phase transferred the general positive/
negative valence learned in the Familiarisation phase to
novel images of scenes from the same categories. The pro-
cedure resembled the ‘predict’ blocks from the Familiarisa-
tion phase. The response options remained ‘positive’ or
‘negative’, but feedback was now given with specific adjec-
tives of positive or negative valence matching the valence
presented during familiarisation (e.g., ‘sad’, ‘happy’; see
Materials).
Study phase
The Study phase presented a continuous stream of trials
constructed from a series of mini-blocks intermixing two
training and one ‘critical’ Study trial for all 48 categories.
The procedure remained identical to the ‘predict’ block in
the two previous phases. In ‘critical’ Study trials previously
trained valence-scene associations were either switched
(inconsistent: High PE condition) or maintained (consis-
tent: Low PE condition). Two-thirds of all trials were train-
ing trials that maintained their previous valence
association. Since Low PE critical study trials also con-
formed to expectations, violations only occurred for High
PE critical study trials (1/6 of all trials). Because the major-
ity (5/6) of trials, therefore, maintained their trained asso-
ciation, participants would be encouraged to make use of
their acquired knowledge and predictions. The number of
trials intervening between High PE trials ranged from 0
to 10, with a mean of 5. Training trials for certain scenes
were intermixed with critical Study trials for other scenes
so that the latter were not all presented at the end of a
block. Critical trials were always paired with unique adjec-
tives whereas training trials were paired with one of eight
specific adjectives (see Materials).
Test phase
The Test Phase assessed associative memory for the
scene-word pairings of critical Study trials using a 3AFC
test. A scene was presented at the centre of the screen with
three words below it. One of the words was the correct
choice (target); the other two words (foils) had the same
valence as the target but had been paired with different
scenes in the critical Study phase. All three alternative
options were selected from the same condition (i.e., either
the High PE or Low PE condition), and appeared three timesduring the Test Phase: once as the target, and twice as a
foil, with the order of these occurrences randomised. The
three choices remained on the screen until participants
selected a word via a button press. Finally, participants
indicated how confident they were of their choice via a
button press (high, low, and guess).
Materials
Stimuli consisted of colour photographs and words. The
photographs were selected to display 48 categories of
indoor and outdoor scenes with 6 distinct images per cat-
egory, i.e., 288 images in total. Categories were randomly
paired with a valence (positive or negative) in the Famil-
iarisation phase. Word stimuli were constructed from 58
adjectives of positive or negative valence. Scenes were
divided into 6 sets; each set contained 48 unique scenes,
one per category. During Training these scenes were paired
with a specific word of a valence consistent with the Famil-
iarisation phase. For critical Study trials, one-half of these
scenes were paired with a word violating this valence. Sce-
nes and words were counterbalanced (for precise details of
scene-word pairings, see Appendix A).
Analysis
In line with the PE hypothesis, the central prediction
was that 3AFC performance would be better when prior
predictions are violated, i.e., more items remembered in
the High than Low PE condition. This hypothesis was
therefore tested with a paired t-test with two-tailed
alpha = .05. Performance was measured by proportion of
correct trials in the Test phase (chance = .33). To examine
declarative memory, analyses focussed on high and low
confidence responses but omitted self-reported guesses.
There was no significant difference in the number of
guesses between conditions, t(19) = 1.67, p = .11, ranging
from 0 to 12 (Mean = 5.90) in the Low PE condition and
from 0 to 13 (Mean = 6.85) in the High PE condition.
Separating performance by high vs. low confidence did
not add any new information; therefore performance is
reported collapsed across confidence.
Results
Performance during training and study
Mean prediction accuracy was high during both Famil-
iarisation Predict blocks (M = .88) and Training blocks
(M = .86), and did not differ significantly between High
and Low PE conditions during the Familiarisation phase, t
(19) = 0.60, p = .55, nor during the Training phase, t(19)
= 0.89, p = .38. At this stage, no difference was expected
because the conditions were identical. For the critical
Study trials, predictions were highly accurate in the Low
PE condition (M = .91) where valence remained the same
for critical trials, but not in the High PE condition
(M = .03) because the contingency was reversed in the High
PE condition.
Memory test performance
Performance on the associative memory 3AFC test is
shown in Table 1. Mean performance was significantly bet-
ter in the High PE condition than Low PE condition, t(19)
Table 1
Mean (standard error in brackets) of performance in the associative 3AFC
test (chance = .33) across all Experiments (high PE performance in Exper-
iment 2b–c is collapsed across 4 and 6 repetition conditions; see text).
Experiment High PE Baseline Low PE
Experiment 1 .66 (.031) – .60 (.023)
Experiment 2a .50 (.026) .49 (.022) .45 (.024)
Experiment 2b .67 (.033) .64 (.035) –
Experiment 2c .58 (.024) .55 (.023) –
Experiment 3 Primed Unprimed
Clear .74 (.035) – .67 (.030)
Degraded .68 (.025) – .60 (.028)
154 A. Greve et al. / Journal of Memory and Language 94 (2017) 149–165= 2.54, p = .01, with a mean difference of .06 (95% confi-
dence interval from .01 to .11), corresponding to a medium
Cohen effect size of d = .57.
Discussion
Experiment 1 manipulated PE by training participants
to expect a word of a particular valence to follow a scene
of a given category. The critical Study trials contained
new scene-word associations either consistent (Low PE)
or inconsistent (High PE) in valence with the trained
expectations. In keeping with our hypothesis, memory for
the new critical scene-word pairing was better in the High
than Low PE condition. This is consistent with the PIMMS
framework proposing that PEs not only drive incremental
associative learning, but also one-shot declarative mem-
ory. We discuss other interpretations of this finding in
the General Discussion.
First, we report further experiments that manipulated
PE in a different way. In Experiments 2a–c, rather than
manipulating the degree to which the sensory evidence
matches the priors, we fixed the difference between the
sensory evidence and the prior, and manipulated instead
the precision of the prior (see Fig. 1b), reasoning that more
precise priors will lead to greater PE when they are
violated.
Experiment 2a
In Experiments 2a–c, we manipulated the prior expec-
tation by training participants to associate a scene with
one or more unfamiliar faces. Experiment 2a tested three
conditions: High PE, Baseline, and Low PE. For Training tri-
als in the High PE condition, a scene was repeatedly paired
with the same face during Training (forming a precise
prior); in the Baseline condition, a scene-face pair was only
presented once (forming a less precise prior); while in the
Low PE condition, a scene was paired with different faces
(forming the least precise prior).
The PE itself occurred in later Study trials when the sce-
nes were paired with completely new and unpredicted
faces in all conditions. Associative memory for these Study
trials was tested using 3AFC, as in Experiment 1, with
response options restricted to Study trials only, in order
to minimise proactive interference from Training trials.
We expected best 3AFC performance in the High PE condi-
tion and worst performance in the Low PE condition.For both Training and Study trials, participants made a
speeded male/female decision about that face. Reaction
times (RTs) for this decision provided an indirect measure
of participants’ predictions, i.e., speeding up during Train-
ing trials showing the same face, and slowing down
between the final Training trial and the Study trial, when
predictions were violated. We therefore tested whether
this RT difference correlated with subsequent memory. Tri-
als of all conditions were intermixed into a continuous
sequence of scene-face pairs, such that participants were
not informed of any difference between Training and Study
trials.
Methods
Participants
Twenty-eight participants were recruited using the
same procedure as described in Experiment 1. Four partic-
ipants were excluded as outliers because their memory
performance pooled across all three conditions deviated
more than two standard deviations from the group mean.
Final analysis included a fully counterbalanced dataset of
twenty-four participants (17 female, mean age 25).
Material & procedure
Stimuli consisted of 108 photographs of indoor and out-
door scenes and 396 photographs of male and female faces.
For Training trials, scenes were repeated 6 times for High
and Low PE conditions but were only presented once in
the Baseline condition. Scene stimuli were divided into 3
sets of 36 images and randomly allocated to the 3 condi-
tions (one set for High PE, Low PE, and Baseline). Face stim-
uli were randomly divided into 8 training sets of 36 images
and allocated to the 3 conditions: one to High PE (one face
was repeated six times with the same scene), six to Low PE
(six different faces were presented once each with the
same scene) and one for Baseline (one face was shown
with one scene only once). Three additional sets of 36 faces
were created, one per condition, which served as critical
Study trials to be paired once with all previously trained
scenes. Previously trained scenes were now paired with
new faces at Study to violate the training predictions and
evoke different degrees of PE across conditions (for coun-
terbalancing of sets see Appendix B). The experiment was
divided into 6 runs, with each run using 18 unique scenes
(6 scenes per condition). The procedure for one run is illus-
trated in Fig. 3 and described below. Participants per-
formed an additional practice block of 6 trials with extra
stimuli in order to become familiar with the procedure.
Familiarisation phase
In the initial Familiarisation phase, each scene appeared
twice in a random order, while participants kept a covert
running count of the number of indoor scenes, which had
to be reported at the end of the phase to ensure partici-
pants were watching the stimuli. Each scene was pre-
sented for 1000 ms in the centre of the screen, separated
by a 250 ms blank screen. The purpose of this phase was
to familiarise participants with each scene, in order to min-
imise differences between the Baseline and High/Low PE
conditions in terms of scene familiarity.
Fig. 3. Design of Experiment 2a showing a single run. At the start of each run, all scenes were presented twice to familiarise participants with the images.
Participants kept count of indoor/outdoor scenes. The Training trials then established either strong priors, by repeatedly presenting the same scene with the
same face (High PE condition), weaker priors, by presenting a scene-face pair only once (Baseline condition) or least strong priors, by presenting the same
scene with different faces (Low PE condition). Critical Study trials (intermixed with Training trials) used novel faces, evoking the different degrees of
prediction error. Participants made speeded male/female decision on the faces. In the Test phase, associative memory for faces paired in the critical Study
trials was assessed, using 3AFC in which the foils came from other critical Study trials.
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For Training trials, six scenes were paired six times with
the same face (High PE condition), six scenes were paired
six times with a different male or female face each time
(Low PE condition), and six scenes were presented with a
face only once (Baseline condition). These conditions were
intermixed within a run. Each Train/Study trial started
with a blank screen for 500 ms, followed by a scene in
the centre of the screen for 1000 ms (allowing participants
time to generate expectancy for the subsequent face). A
face was then superimposed on the screen for another
1000 ms. The face occurred on the top or bottom of the
screen (an equal number of times). This top/bottom loca-
tion was consistent across the six repetitions of the same
face during High PE Training trials, but alternated with
each new face during Low PE Training trials. Half of the
faces were male and the other half female, which alter-
nated across Low PE trials. Participants were instructed
to make speeded gender judgement using the assigned
response keys that were counterbalanced across partici-
pants. Participants were aware that their memory would
be tested later, but were informed that this was only a sec-
ondary goal of the study. Their primary focus was to
acquire gender judgements as fast and as accurate as
possible.
Mini-runs of 2–3 scenes from each condition were
interspersed, so that Study trials for a particular scene
always occurred after its Training trials, but Study trials
for some scenes could occur before Training trials for other
scenes. Participants were not informed of the difference
between Training and Study trials. An average lag of 11
intervening trials separated the final Training trial and
the critical Study trial for a given scene. The gender and/
or location of the face in the Study trial was switched rel-
ative to that in the final Training trial for half of the Study
trials, but remained the same for the other half.
Test phase
After the Training/Study phase, participants performed
an odd/even distractor task for 40 s, to reduce any contri-
bution of short-term memory. A random number between
0 and 99 occurred on the screen, and participants judged
whether the number is odd or even, indicating their choice
via a button press.
Memory for face-scene pairs from critical Study trials
was assessed using a 3AFC test similar to Experiment 1.
Each scene was presented with three faces below it – the
target and two foils – and the participants’ choice was fol-
lowed by an indication of high or low confidence, using one
of two keys. Participants then were prompted to recall the
location (i.e., top/bottom) of the face. This ‘‘Context Mem-
ory” decision was made using a button-press in a four-way
judgment of ‘‘think top, guess top, guess bottom or think
bottom”.
Analysis
The main hypothesis was for associative memory 3AFC
performance to increase as the precision of predictions,
and hence size of PE, increased. Two pairwise t-tests were
used: (1) Low PE vs. Baseline and (2) Baseline vs. High PE.
Separating performance by high vs. low confidence did notadd any new information, nor did analysis of the context
memory decisions; therefore performance was collapsed
across these factors.
Results
Associative memory
Performance on the associative memory 3AFC test is
shown in Table 1. As expected, mean performance was best
in the High PE condition, and worst in the Low PE condi-
tion. Pairwise tests confirmed significantly better perfor-
mance in the Baseline than Low PE condition, t(23)
= 2.93, p = .01, d = .39 (mean difference: .04; 95% confi-
dence interval from .005 to .08), though any difference
between High PE and Baseline conditions did not reach sig-
nificance, t(23) = .68, p = .50, d = .14 (mean difference: .02,
95% confidence interval from .02 to .06).
RTs during training and study
Reaction times as a function of Training trials (1–6) and
critical Study trial are shown in Fig. 4a. There was a signif-
icant linear decrease in RTs across the six Training trials in
the High PE condition, t(23) = 11.5, p < .001, but not in the
Low PE condition, t(23) = .96, p = .34, as would be expected
since High PE scene-face pairs remained the same, whereas
Low PE faces were new for each trial. There was a signifi-
cant slowing in RTs from the final (sixth) Training trial to
the Study trial in the High PE condition, t(23) = 13.1,
p < .001, and in the Low PE condition, t(23) = 3.68,
p = .001, as well as from the first (and only) Training trial
to the Study trial in the Baseline condition, t(23) = 2.73,
p = .01 (Fig. 4b). The degree of this slowing was greater in
the High PE condition than either of the other two condi-
tions, t(23) > 9.15, p < .001. Finally, RTs for the critical
Study trial did not differ between High and Low PE condi-
tions, t(23) = .67, p = .51, though were slower in the Base-
line condition than in both of the other conditions, t(23)
> 2.46, p < .01.
Correlation between RT slow-down and associative memory
If the slow-down in RTs between the final Training trial
and the critical Study trial indexes the amount of predic-
tion error, then we would expect this to correlate posi-
tively with the amount of learning, i.e., associative
memory performance. This RT slow-down (Final Training
RT minus Critical Study RT) is plotted against associative
memory performance for each participant and condition
in Fig. 5a. The correlation was significantly positive in the
High PE condition, r(23) = .57, p = .004, but did not reach
significance in either the Baseline, r(23) = .08, p = .72, or
Low PE, r(23) = .04, p = .87, conditions. Note that associa-
tive memory did not correlate with raw RTs of critical
Study trials in any of the three conditions, including the
High PE condition, r(23) < .08, p > .71, and the correlation
between associative memory and the difference between
Training and critical Study RTs in the High PE condition
remained significant after partialling out critical Study
RTs, r(21) = .57, p = .004. These findings demonstrate that
it is the slow-down between Training and critical Study tri-
als (presumably reflecting prediction error) that determi-
Fig. 4. Reaction times (RTs) for (a + b) Experiment 2a, (c + d) Experiment 2b and (e + f) Experiment 2c. The top panels (a, c, e) show RTs across multiple
Training repetitions for High PE (brown, solid) and Low PE (blue, dotted) conditions. The bottom panels (b, d, f) show RTs for final Training and critical Study
trials, which were intermixed (i.e., the x-axis implies temporal order only for single scene, but not across different scenes). Baseline condition (red, dashed).
Error bars are standard errors. Final Training in the bottom panel is also Training trial 6 in top panel. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this
figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
Fig. 5. Scatter plot of associative memory performance against slow-down in RTs between final Training and critical Study trial for (a) Experiment 2a, (b)
Experiment 2b and (c) Experiment 2c. Regression lines are superimposed for the baseline condition (dashed red line), High PE condition (solid brown line)
and Low PE condition (solid blue line). (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this
article.)
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processing the novel faces in the critical Study trials.
Discussion
Experiment 2a examined the effect of the precision of
the priors, i.e., degree to which a given scene predicted a
face, on encoding of a new pairing of that scene with a
novel face. As hypothesized, memory for the new scene-
face pairing was better when the erroneous prior was more
precise, consistent with a larger prediction error. This
memory advantage was reflected by significantly better
3AFC associative memory performance in the High PE
and Baseline conditions than the Low PE condition. More-
over, a more direct measure of prediction error – namely
the slow-down in RTs for face gender judgements in criti-
cal Study trials relative to final Training trials – correlatedpositively with associative memory within the High PE
condition, and this correlation was not driven simply by
RTs for the critical Study Trials.
There was a speed-up in RTs across the six Training tri-
als in the High PE but not Low PE condition. While this is
consistent with participants making predictions about
the face that follows a given scene in the High PE condition,
it is also possible that this speed-up simply reflects more
fluent processing of the (repeated) face itself, regardless
of the preceding scene-prediction. In other words, this RT
speed-up could reflect repetition priming of faces in the
High PE condition, which could not occur in the Baseline
or Low PE conditions. This repetition priming could reflect
tuning of a perceptual representation of the face (resulting
in a more precise evidence distribution, as assumed by
PIMMS in Fig. 1C and Experiment 3). Alternatively, the RT
speed-up could reflect retrieval of stimulus-response (S-
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male/female response, without any change in the stimulus
representation itself (Henson, Eckstein, Waszak, Frings, &
Horner, 2014). Any of these accounts would also predict
the slow-down in RTs for the novel face in the critical
Study trial of the High PE condition (though the fact that
the gender of the faces used in the final Training trial and
Study trial switched on 50% of trials, i.e., gender was only
compatible half of the time, may have attenuated any
influence of S-R bindings). Importantly, however, only the
scene-prediction (PE) account naturally explains why the
size of this slow-down between Training and Study corre-
lates with subsequent memory for the novel scene-face
pairing in the High PE condition.
According to PIMMS, there is no reason why this corre-
lation between RT slow-down and subsequent memory
should not also occur in the Baseline or even Low PE con-
dition if one assumes that there is variation across partici-
pants in how well a scene can be associated with a face
(following one Training trial). One reason why this correla-
tion did not reach significance in the Baseline and Low PE
conditions may be simply the limited range of this varia-
tion, relative to the larger range induced by reinforcing
predictions across multiple Training trials in the High PE
condition. Another reason may be because the RT slow-
down between Training and critical Study in Baseline and
Low PE conditions also includes other components that
swamp individual differences in predictions. For example,
it is possible that participants learned, to varying degrees
through the course of the experiment, that changes occur
after the first or sixth presentation of a scene. This may
have caused some participants to slow down in anticipa-
tion of that change, in all conditions, and this general
slow-down may not necessarily improve memory.
Finally, though the pairwise test of 3AFC memory
between Baseline vs. Low PE conditions was significant,
the High PE vs. Baseline comparison did not reach signifi-
cance. It is important to establish whether memory is bet-
ter in the High PE than Baseline condition because worse
performance of the Low PE condition could potentially be
explained by proactive interference. More precisely, the
3AFC test only offered faces from Study trials, so that none
of the potentially interfering faces that were paired with
the same scene in Training trials were a response option.
Although this controls for overt proactive interference, it
is possible that interfering faces from Training trials still
‘‘come to mind” and impair target selection in the 3AFC
test trials (cf. the ‘‘fan effect”, Radvansky, 1999;
Schneider & Anderson, 2012; Sohn, Anderson, Reeder, &
Godde, 2004). Indeed, such covert retrieval of trained faces
could have occurred during Study trials too, impeding
learning of the new face association. Such interference
could explain the worse performance in the Low PE condi-
tion relative to Baseline condition, in that up to six compet-
ing faces could intrude in the Low PE condition, but only
one could intrude in the Baseline condition. However,
any such covert interference from the trained faces would
also be greater for the High PE condition (when it is paired
six times) than Baseline condition (when it is paired only
once), predicting better, not worse, performance in the
Baseline than High PE condition. Hence Experiment 2bre-tested the comparison of Baseline and High PE
conditions.Experiment 2b
The purpose of Experiment 2b was to test whether the
small numerical advantage in associative memory for High
PE relative to Baseline conditions in Experiment 2a would
be significant when statistical power was increased. We
therefore omitted the Low PE condition, in order to
increase the number of trials in the remaining two condi-
tions. Without the intermixed trials of the Low PE condi-
tion, in which the face paired with a given scene changed
frequently, we were concerned that participants might be
able to predict when the face would change in the High
PE condition (i.e., learn that once a scene-face pairing
had been repeated once, it would be presented six times
in total before changing in the critical Study trial). To
increase the uncertainty about when a face pairing would
change, we split the High PE condition into two sub-
conditions in which the pairing changed after either 4 or
6 Training trials (henceforth, the High PE4 and High PE6
conditions).
A further change from Experiment 2a was that the gen-
der of the face always switched between Training and
Study trials. This should reduce the RT variability induced
by compatible versus incompatible S-R bindings between
Training and Study trials that may have occurred in Exper-
iment 2a.
Methods
Participants
Twenty-seven participants were recruited, using the
same procedure as in Experiment 1. Three participants
were excluded as outlier because their memory perfor-
mance pooled across all three conditions deviated more
than two standard deviations from the group mean. Final
analysis included a fully counterbalanced dataset of
twenty-four participants (13 females, mean age 23).
Material & procedure
Stimuli consisted of 96 photographs of indoor and out-
door scenes and 192 photographs of male and female faces,
a subset of those used in Experiment 2a. Stimuli were con-
structed similar to Experiment 2a with the exception of
omitting the Low PE condition. The current experiment,
therefore, contained 2 conditions: a Baseline condition
and a High PE condition. The number of Training presenta-
tions in the High PE condition was either 4 or 6 (for details
of scene-word pairings see Appendix C).
The experiment was divided into 6 runs, each present-
ing 16 unique scenes for Training, Study and Test trials (8
scenes per condition). Participants performed an additional
practice block of 6 trials in order to become familiar with
the procedure.
The procedure for one run was similar to Experiment
2a, in which all conditions were intermixed. At the start,
all scenes in that run were presented twice in random
order to familiarise the participants with the images. The
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unique scenes-face pairs, presented 4 times; and another
24 unique scenes-face pairs, presented 6 times. For the
Baseline condition, the Training trials consisted of 48
unique scenes-faces pairs shown only once. Study trials
were intermixed into the continuous stream of Training
trials, with an average lag of 11 intervening trials between
trials containing the same scene image. The location of the
face on the scene always switched between final Training
and critical Study trials.
Following the odd/even distractor task, a 3AFC test of
associative memory was presented with an identical pro-
cedure and trial structures as in Experiment 2a, including
confidence judgements. Again, separating performance by
high vs. low confidence did not add any new information,
and so performance was collapsed across it.
Results
Associative memory
As planned, for analysis of associative memory, we col-
lapsed across High PE4 and High PE6 conditions to equate
their trial numbers with those in the Baseline condition
and hence maximise power. The results are shown in
Table 1. Overall performance was higher than in Experi-
ment 2a, most likely because fewer new face-scene associ-
ations were presented during each ‘‘mini-run” of Training
and Study trials. As predicted, memory was better for the
High PE than Baseline condition, but statistical compar-
isons revealed only marginally significant differences t
(23) = 2.00, p = .058, d = .41 (mean difference: .03; upper
and lower 95% confidence interval: .055 and .001).
RTs during training and study
Reaction times as a function of Training trials and the
critical Study trial are shown in Fig. 4c. There was a signif-
icant linear decrease in RTs across Training trials collapsing
across High PE conditions, t(23) = 7.15, p < .001. Significant
slowing in RTs from the final Training trial to the critical
Study trial was present in the High PE condition, t(23)
= 10.27, p < .001, but not the Baseline condition, t(23)
= .91, p = .37. The degree of this slowing was significantly
greater in High PE conditions relative to the Baseline con-
dition, t(23) = 7.58, p < .001 and mean RTs for the critical
Study trial did not differ significantly across conditions t
(23) = 1.78, p = .088 (Fig. 4d).
Correlation between RT slow-down and associative memory
The slow-down in RTs between the final Training trial
and the critical Study trial is plotted against associative
memory for each participant and condition in Fig. 5b. A sig-
nificant positive correlation was again found in the High PE
condition, r(23) = .38, p = .04, but not in the Baseline condi-
tion, r(23) = .03, p = .89. Analogous to Experiment 2a, asso-
ciative memory did not correlate with raw RTs of critical
Study trials in either condition, r(23) > .22, p = .29 and r
(23) < .15, p = .47, but was significantly correlated with
the slowdown in RTs between the final Training and criti-
cal Study trials in the High PE condition, even after par-
tialling out critical Study RTs, r(21) = .57, p < .01, again
demonstrating that memory does not depend simply onthe amount of time spent processing the novel faces in
the critical Study trials.
Discussion
Though the difference between memory performance in
the High PE and Baseline was in the predicted direction,
this difference did not quite reach conventional two-
tailed significance levels. We therefore postpone discus-
sion until replicating the effect in the more highly-
powered Experiment 2c.
Experiment 2c
Experiment 2c was a nearly exact replication of Exper-
iment 2b, except for the minor change that context mem-
ory was no longer assessed, which meant that faces could
be presented in the middle of the screen at Study (rather
than at top or bottom). Importantly, based on the High
PE versus Baseline effect size in Experiment 2b, we pow-
ered the study to have a 75% probability of detecting a sig-
nificant memory advantage by using 36 participants (the
next number of participants after 24 that allowed full
counterbalancing).
Participants
Thirty-six participants (25 female, mean age 24) were
recruited, using the same procedure as in Experiment 1.
Material & procedure
These were the same as Experiment 2b.
Results
Associative memory
As planned, we collapsed across High PE4 and High PE6
conditions (results are shown in Table 1). Overall memory
performance was worse than in Experiment 2b, for reasons
that are unclear and may simply relate to different partic-
ipant samples. Nonetheless, the within-participant com-
parison of High PE versus Baseline conditions was in the
same direction and of similar magnitude, and importantly
now reached significance, t(35) = 2.37, p = .023, d = .22
(mean difference: .03; upper and lower 95% confidence
interval: .06 and .005).
RTs during training and study
Reaction times as a function of Training trials and the
critical Study trial are shown in Fig. 4e and 4f. The results
replicated those of Experiment 2b, with a significant linear
decrease in RTs across Training trials, collapsing the High
PE conditions, t(23) > 7.50, p < .001. There was a significant
slowing in RTs from the final Training trial to the critical
Study trial in the High PE conditions, t(23) = 9.44,
p < .001, and also the Baseline condition, t(23) = 2.59,
p = .014. The degree of this slowing was significantly
greater in the High PE conditions than Baseline condition,
t(35) > 5.71, p < .001 and mean RTs for the critical Study
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< 0.79, p > .43.
Correlation between RT slow-down and associative memory
The slow-down in RTs between the final Training trial
and the critical Study trial is plotted against associative
memory for each participant and condition in Fig. 5c.
Again, the results replicated those of Experiment 2b, with
a significant positive correlation in the High PE condition,
r(35) = .43, p < .01, but not in the Baseline condition, r
(35) = .04, p = .83. Associative memory did not correlate
with critical Study trial RTs in either condition, r(35)
< .04, p = .81 and r(35) < .14, p = .42, but remained signifi-
cantly correlated with the slow-down in RTs between final
Training and critical Study trials in the High PE condition
even after partialling out critical Study trial RTs, r(33)
= .44, p < .01, again demonstrating that memory did not
depend simply on the amount of time spent processing
the novel faces in the critical Study trials.
Discussion
By adding more trials and testing more participants to
boost power, Experiment 2c confirmed that associative
memory is better in the High PE condition than Baseline
condition, supporting the trends in Experiment 2a and
2b. This is important because it challenges the alternative
explanation of Experiment 2a’s results in terms of proac-
tive interference, since the High PE condition should have
suffered from more proactive interference than the Base-
line condition, owing to the stronger association from the
greater number of Training trials. Furthermore, both
Experiments 2b and 2c replicated the slow-down in RTs
between Training and critical Study trials in the High PE
condition, and the correlation of this slow-down with sub-
sequent associative memory. These results are consistent
with the hypothesis that participants make predictions
for the faces that follow each scene, which are subse-
quently violated in the critical Study trials. The degree of
this violation (depending on the strength of the prediction)
predicts how well the new scene-face pairing will be
remembered later. We return to this and other interpreta-
tions in the General Discussion. First, we report a final
approach to manipulating PE, this time by varying the pre-
cision of the evidence distribution, without changing the
priors.Experiment 3
Experiments 3 again tested the one-shot encoding of
novel scene-face pairs, but this time by manipulating the
sensory evidence for the faces by (i) perceptual degrada-
tion and (ii) priming. In contrast to Experiment 2, scenes
were presented only once at encoding, so participants were
unable to predict the subsequent face (corresponding to
the ‘‘flat”, or at least non-systematic, prior in Fig. 1c).
Moreover, in Experiment 3, half of the faces in the critical
Study trials were masked with random, pixel noise, which
should reduce the precision of the sensory evidence, and
hence reduce PE for these trials (left side of Fig. 1c).Orthogonal to this manipulation of perceptual clarity, one
half of the faces were presented in a prior Training phase.
This ‘‘priming” is assumed to increase the precision of
the evidence during the critical Study trials, and hence
increase PE (right side of Fig. 1c). We therefore hypothe-
sized better 3AFC associative memory for the critical Study
trials for (1) clear relative to degraded faces and (2) primed
relative to unprimed faces. We had no specific prediction
about whether these factors would interact (this would
depend on whether the changes in precision of the evi-
dence were super-additive or sub-additive).
Methods
Participants
Nineteen participants were recruited using the same
procedure as described in Experiment 1. Three participants
were excluded because their test performance was at
chance. Final analysis included a fully counterbalanced
dataset of 16 participants (5 female, mean age 27).
Material & procedure
Primed and degraded faces were fully crossed into 4
Study conditions: Primed & Clear (PC), Primed & Degraded
(PD), Novel & Clear (NC), Novel & Degraded (ND). Stimuli
consisted of 192 colour photographs of indoor and outdoor
scenes and 192 black and white photographs of male and
female faces. Faces were degraded by replacing a random
set (57%) of the image pixels with grey pixels, using
MATLAB. Pilot data confirmed that degraded faces were
harder to identify, but could still be recognized as the same
person as in the clear version. Scene and face stimuli were
divided into 4 sets of 48 images and randomly allocated to
the 4 conditions (PC, PD, NC, ND), counterbalanced across
participants (see Appendix C for more details).
The experiment was divided into 16 runs, 8 in the clear
face condition and 8 in the degraded face condition (face
degradation conditions were not mixed within run). Each
run contained 6 primed and 6 unprimed faces, each with
a unique scene. The procedure for one run is illustrated
in Fig. 6 and described below. Participants performed an
additional practice block of 5 trials with extra stimuli in
order to become familiar with the procedure.
Training phase
The Training Phase was introduced to vary the percep-
tual representation for half of the faces presented at Study
via pre-exposing (priming) them. For each run, 6 out of 12
faces were presented three times in pseudorandomised
order, with all faces being presented once before being pre-
sented again. All faces were presented clearly in this phase.
Trials started with a centrally presented fixation cross
(500 ms), before a face appeared in the middle of the
screen for 1750 ms. In that time period, participants made
subjective and speeded judgements whether this face was
‘more pleasant’ or ‘less pleasant’ than average.
Study phase
Two different sets of Study runs were created, one pre-
senting scenes paired with degraded faces, of which half
were trained/primed (DP) and the other half was not
Fig. 6. Design of Experiment 3. 12 scene-face pairs were shown per block, in 16 blocks. In both Training and Study phases, the primary task was to judge
pleasantness of the faces. In the Training phase all faces were presented clearly. At Study participants were presented with degraded faces of which half
were primed (DP) and the other half were not primed/novel (DN) and clear (not degraded) faces, of which half were primed (CP) and the other half was not
primed/novel (CN). During Study an occasional target task was to spot scenes containing the moon (not shown). The distractor task was a 15 s odd/even
number classification task. Test was 3AFC, self-paced and faces were presented degraded in all conditions.
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presented scenes with clear (not degraded) faces, of which
half were primed (CP) and the other half was not primed/
novel (CN). The presentation of the two sets alternated
within participants, and the start order was counterbal-
anced across participants. The presentation of primed
and novel faces within a run was intermixed such that nei-
ther primed or novel trials were presented for more than 3
successive trials. Each Study trial started with a scene
shown in the centre of the screen for 1000 ms. A face
was then superimposed on the scene for another 400 ms
followed by a response screen showing a fixation cross
for 800 ms. Participants made the same pleasant/unpleas-
ant judgement as in the Training Phase. In order to ensure
participants would attend to the scene, they were
instructed to press a key if they saw a picture of the moon,
which would occur 1–2 times per block. In moon trials, noface appeared, and the image disappeared after 1400 ms,
with an 800 ms gap preceding the next trial’s onset, so trial
timing was maintained. Moon trials were pseudorandomly
interspersed so that they were never consecutive.
Test phase
After the Study phase, participants performed an odd/
even distractor task for 15 s, to reduce any contribution
of short-term memory. Memory for face-scene pairs was
assessed using a 3AFC test. After a 300 ms blank screen, a
scene was presented with three faces displayed below it.
All faces, regardless of study condition, were shown as
degraded images, with the pixel noise identical to that
used for the same face at Study, such that there was a per-
ceptual study-test match for degraded faces. If anything,
this match would boost performance for degraded relative
to clear faces, making the predicted advantage for clear
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same condition, target location was counterbalanced
across Test trials, and all three options appeared three
times during the Test Phase: once as the target, and twice
as a foil, with the order of these occurrences randomised.
Analysis
3AFC memory performance was assessed with a 2  2
ANOVA, in which we predicted main effects of degradation
and of priming. Given our specific hypotheses, follow-up
pairwise t-tests were conducted for the simple effects of
degradation under each level of priming, and the simple
effects of priming under each level of degradation.
Results
Performance on the associative memory 3AFC test is
shown in Table 1. As expected, performance was best for
conditions with higher PE owing to more precise sensory
evidence (i.e., clear and primed conditions). The 2  2
ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of degradation,
F(1,15) = 12.75, p = .003, and of priming F(1,15) = 11.42,
p = .004. The interaction was not significant, F(1,15) < 1,
p = .561. Pairwise t-tests confirmed that associative mem-
ory for clear faces was superior to degraded faces, whether
primed, t(15) = 2.15, p = .05, d = .48 (mean difference: .06;
95% confidence interval from .0004 to .12), or unprimed,
t(15) = 3.68, p = .002, d = .67 (mean difference: .08; 95%
confidence interval from .03 to .12). Furthermore, associa-
tive memory for primed faces was superior to novel faces,
whether presented clearly, t(15) = 2.42, p = .03, d = .48
(mean difference: .06; 95% confidence interval from .01
to .12) or degraded, t(15) = 3.05, p = .01, d = .76 (mean dif-
ference: .08; 95% confidence interval from .02 to .14).
Discussion
According to PIMMS, Experiment 3 manipulated the
precision of the sensory evidence for a face, to see if this
affects the ability to form a new association between that
face and an (unpredictive) scene. As hypothesized, mem-
ory for the new scene-face pairing was better when the
evidence was more precise, consistent with a larger predic-
tion error. This memory advantage was reflected by signif-
icantly better 3AFC associative memory performance for
primed over novel faces, as well as clear over degraded
faces.
Faces would be expected to be processed more fluently
when primed relative to unprimed, and when clear relative
to degraded. One might generally expect more fluent per-
ception to lead to better memory. It is important to note,
however, that we tested memory for the scene-face associ-
ation, not for the face itself (and both 3AFC foils were stud-
ied in the same manner, i.e., equally fluent). Moreover,
while one might expect perceptually degraded images to
be worse remembered, the test faces in the 3AFC were also
degraded with the same noise used in the study phase,
which, if anything, should favour memory for the degraded
faces, in terms of study-test perceptual match. Further-
more, these findings did not require manipulating the pri-
ors by training different scene-face pairings, and so cannotreflect differences in item familiarity or proactive interfer-
ence. We consider the PIMMS account, and other potential
interpretations such as attentional resources, in the Gen-
eral Discussion, in the context of all three experimental
designs used here.General discussion
The present series of experiments support our hypoth-
esis that predictions, specifically prediction errors, play a
role in one-shot, declarative memory in humans. We sys-
tematically manipulated prediction errors by changing:
the difference between the mode of the prior and the evi-
dence distribution (Experiment1), the precision of the
prior, while keeping the difference between the mode of
prior and evidence constant (Experiment 2a–c) and the
precision of the evidence, without any prior expectations
(Experiment 3).
We found a consistent pattern across experiments,
whereby associative memory for a single, arbitrary pairing
of a scene with a novel word or face was best when that
word/face was least predicted by prior expectations. More
specifically, memory for a new scene-word pairing in
Experiment 1 was better when the scene was previously
associated with a different category of words, relative to
when it was associated with the same category of words.
Likewise, memory for a new scene-face pairing in Experi-
ments 2a–c was best when the scene was strongly associ-
ated with a different face, relative to being only weakly
associated with a different face. Finally, in Experiment 3
memory was best for new scene-face pairs when faces
were presented more clearly and when they were previ-
ously primed.
All of these findings are in keeping with the PIMMS
framework (Henson & Gagnepain, 2010), in which predic-
tion error drives all types of memory. Given the long tradi-
tion of paired associate learning in humans, and the history
of PE in animal learning (Pearce & Hall, 1980; Rescorla &
Wagner, 1972; Schultz et al., 1997), it may seem surprising
that findings like ours have not been reported before (to
our knowledge). We suspect that one reason for this relates
to our use of 3AFC to measure associative memory; specif-
ically our use of response options that did not include
items from the Training phase, but only used items from
the critical Study trials. This is important in order to con-
trol for ‘‘proactive interference” of associations from the
Training phase (Keppel & Underwood, 1962; Postman,
1962; Underwood, 1957). For example, had we included
Trained items among the response options, or used cued
recall instead (as typical of many human paired associate
studies), then we expect that memory performance in
Experiment 1 would actually be worse (rather than better)
in the High PE than Low PE conditions, because partici-
pants would use their knowledge about the valence associ-
ated with each scene to bias their choices towards words
congruent with that valence (a ‘‘congruency” advantage;
Craik & Tulving, 1975; Hall & Geis, 1980; Schulman,
1974). Likewise, we expect that memory performance in
Experiment 2a–c would actually be worse in the High PE
condition than the Baseline condition, because in the High
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the same scene, and so would be more likely to win any
response competition during the test phase against a face
paired only once.
Nonetheless, there are alternative explanations for the
results in each of our experiments, which we consider
below.
Feedback-driven learning
An alternative explanation for the results of Experiment
1 is that participants learned better when they received
explicit, negative feedback (i.e., an explicit error signal),
which occurred on most critical trials in the High PE condi-
tion, but on very few trials in the Low PE condition. This
feedback-driven account, however, would seem unable to
explain the results in Experiment 2a–c and 3, where there
was no explicit feedback given; the participant’s task was
only to make an easy, binary and/or subjective decision
about the face.
Stimulus associability
A possible alternative interpretation of the findings in
Experiments 2a–c is that participants abandoned attending
to scenes that were not predictive (in the Low PE condi-
tion), and/or paid extra attention to scenes that were
highly predictive (in the High PE condition). This relates
to the idea of stimulus ‘‘associability” (Beesley & Le
Pelley, 2011; Le Pelley, 2004; Le Pelley & McLaren, 2003).
This idea, originally introduced by Mackintosh (1975), pro-
poses that in addition to associating a stimulus with a
specific reward, animals update the associability of that
stimulus as a function of its past history of pairings with
rewards (i.e., associability is a property of the stimulus
itself, rather than stimulus-reward association). It is possi-
ble that the associability of scenes in the High PE condi-
tions of Experiments 2a–c became higher than those in
the Low PE or Baseline conditions, explaining the stronger
association formed when those High PE stimuli were
paired with a new face. However, such an associability
account could not explain the results of Experiment 1 or
Experiment 3. In Experiment 1, the scenes in the High PE
and Low PE conditions had identical associative histories
up to the critical Study trial, so could not differ in associa-
bility at the point of encoding. Equally, Experiment 3 did
not pair any stimuli prior to the critical Study phase, so
that differences in associability could not emerge.
Other associative interference accounts
As previously mentioned in the Discussion of Experi-
ment 2a, the difference between High and Low PE condi-
tions in that experiment could reflect interference during
Study and/or during 3AFC test, from prior associations
established in the Training phase: specifically, a greater
number of competing associations might occur in the
Low PE condition. Although our 3AFC test controls for overt
proactive interference, in the sense that prior associates
from the Training phase are not response options, those
associates may still come to mind covertly, and interferewith ongoing processing. A similar type of interference
might have occurred during the test phase of Experiment
1, where test trials from the Consistent condition would
have one more competing word that comes to mind by vir-
tue of being consistent with the trained words. However,
this interference account would seem unable to explain
the memory advantage for primed and clear faces in Exper-
iment 3 (where there was no prior association), and more
importantly, would actually predict the opposite pattern
of results when comparing the High PE and Baseline condi-
tions of Experiment 2b–c, i.e., worse, not better, perfor-
mance in the High PE condition, because the High PE
condition had more repeated pairings than the Baseline
conditions.Resource-based/attentional accounts
An alternative explanation of the results of Experiment
3 is that primed faces, and faces without noise, require
fewer ‘‘processing resources”. This then frees up resources
from processing the face itself, allowing those resources to
better encode the face-scene association instead. This
resembles the ‘‘Item-Context” trade-off account of dissoci-
ations between item and source memory that was pro-
posed by Jurica and Shimamura (1999). The same type of
explanation could apply to the results of Experiments 1,
2a–c, if it is assumed that items that are predicted by a
cue (scene) require fewer resources.
A related idea is that unpredicted stimuli engage
greater selective attention, and it is this increase in atten-
tion that drives memory encoding. However, both the
resource and attentional accounts appear to be insufficient
explanations, because there must be an initial cause of the
change in attention/resources in Experiments 1, 2a–c. It
seems likely that this cause arises when a prediction is
not fulfilled, i.e., by appealing to the concept of PE. It is pos-
sible that attention/resources mediate the relationship
between PE and one-shot associative encoding – e.g., that
without the increased attention triggered by PE, that PE
does not translate into improved memory. This might be
tested by future experiments that factorially manipulate
the amount of attentional resources (e.g., in dual-task
paradigms), or with other methods like electroencephalog-
raphy that can temporally dissociate PE from subsequent
attentional changes.Conclusion
In summary, although there may be possible alternative
accounts for the individual results of Experiment 1, Exper-
iments 2a–c and Experiment 3, like those outlined above,
the prediction error account of the PIMMS framework
would seem the most parsimonious account when taking
all findings together. Indeed, the experimental designs,
and the predictions for their outcomes, were generated a
priori by the PIMMS framework. While future work may
show that prediction error on its own is not sufficient, in
that increased attention that follows a prediction error
may be needed to encode stronger memories, the concept
of PE appears central to explain the present findings.
164 A. Greve et al. / Journal of Memory and Language 94 (2017) 149–165While the present concepts of unimodal distributions
for a single prior and single evidence distribution in
Fig. 1 are likely too simplistic, the PIMMS framework is
an example of recent Bayesian approaches that offer a
more general, unifying framework for explaining many
aspects of human and animal learning (Courville, Daw, &
Touretzky, 2006; Dayan, Kakade, & Montague, 2000;
Gallistel & Gibbon, 2000; Gershman & Niv, 2012). Unlike
purely associative theories, Bayesian models assume that
animals acquire a ‘world model’, reflecting statistical regu-
larities between stimuli, outcomes and contexts (Barto,
Mirolli, & Baldassarre, 2013). For example, if stimuli are
highly predictive of outcomes in one context, but not in
another context, then the learning of the same pairings
should differ across contexts, with less learning occurring
in the less predictive context, corresponding to ‘‘expected
uncertainty” (Yu & Dayan, 2005). According to PIMMS, con-
texts, stimuli and outcomes (and potentially further levels
of representation) correspond to hierarchical levels within
a neural perceptual processing pathway (Henson &
Gagnepain, 2010). The concept of priors, evidence and pre-
diction errors (at each level of this hierarchy), as presented
by the PIMMS framework, therefore, may offer a general
way of understanding these empirical phenomena and
their neural bases.
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